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ABSTRACT 
 Mobile ad-hoc networks are temporary 
wireless networks. Network resources are 
abnormally consumed by intruders. Anomaly and 
signature based techniques are used for intrusion 
detection. Classification techniques are used in 
anomaly based techniques. Intrusion detection 
techniques are used for the network attack 
detection process. Two types of intrusion 
detection systems are available. They are anomaly 
detection and signature based detection model. 
The anomaly detection model uses the historical 
transactions with attack labels. The signature 
database is used in the signature based IDS 
schemes.  
  The mobile ad-hoc networks are 
infrastructure less environment. The intrusion 
detection applications are placed in a set of nodes 
under the mobile ad-hoc network environment. 
The nodes are grouped into clusters. The leader 
nodes are assigned for the clusters. The leader 
node is assigned for the intrusion detection 
process. Leader nodes are used to initiate the 
intrusion detection process. Resource sharing and 
lifetime management factors are considered in the 
leader election process. The system optimizes the 
leader election and intrusion detection process. 
  The system is designed to handle leader 
election and intrusion detection process. The 
clustering scheme is optimized with coverage and 
traffic level. Cost and resource utilization is 
controlled under the clusters. Node mobility is 
managed by the system.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Unlike traditional networks, the Mobile Ad 
hoc Networks (MANETs) have no fixed 
chokepoints/bottlenecks where Intrusion 
Detection Systems (IDSs) can be deployed [3]. 
Hence, a node may need to run its own IDS [1] 
and cooperate with others to ensure security. This 
is very inefficient in terms of resource 
consumption since mobile nodes are energy-
limited. To overcome this problem, a common 
approach is to divide the MANET into a set of 1-
hop clusters where each node belongs to at least 
one cluster. The nodes in each cluster elect a 
leader node (cluster head) to serve as the IDS for 
the entire cluster.  
The leader-IDS election process can be 
either random or based on the connectivity. Both 
approaches aim to reduce the overall resource 
consumption of IDSs in the network. However, 
we notice that nodes usually have different 
remaining resources at any given time, which 
should be taken into account by an election 
scheme. Unfortunately, with the random model, 
each node is equally likely to be elected regardless 
of its remaining resources [11]. The connectivity 
index-based approach elects a node with a high 
degree of connectivity even though the node may 
have little resources left. With both election 
schemes, some nodes will die faster than others, 
leading to a loss in connectivity and potentially 
the partition of network. Although it is clearly 
desirable to balance the resource consumption of 
IDSs among nodes, this objective is difficult to 
achieve since the resource level is the private 
information of a node. Unless sufficient incentives 
are provided, nodes might misbehave by acting 
selfishly and lying about their resources level to 
not consume their resources for serving others 
while receiving others services. Moreover, even 
when all nodes can truthfully reveal their resource 
levels, it remains a challenging issue to elect an 
optimal collection of leaders to balance the overall 
resource consumption without flooding the 
network. Next, we motivate further discussions 
through a concrete example. 
 The problem of selfishness and energy 
balancing exists in many other applications to 
which our solution is also applicable. Like in IDS 
scheme, leader election is needed for routing and 
key distribution [6] in MANET. In key 
management, a central key distributor is needed to 
update the keys of nodes. In routing, the nodes are 
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grouped into small clusters and each cluster elects 
a cluster head (leader) to forward the packets of 
other nodes. Thus, one node can stay alive, while 
others can be in the energy-saving mode. The 
election of a leader node is done randomly, based 
on connectivity (nodes’ degree) or based on a 
node’s weight. We have already pointed out the 
problems of random model and connectivity 
model. We believe that a weightbased leader 
election should be the proper method for election. 
Unfortunately, the information regarding the 
remaining energy is private to a node, and thus, 
not verifiable. Since nodes might behave selfishly, 
they might lie about their resource level to avoid 
being the leader if there is no mechanism to 
motivate them. Our method can effectively 
address this issue. 
 
2. RELATED WORK 
This section reviews related work on 
intrusion detection in MANET, the application of 
mechanism design to networks, and the 
application of leader election scheme to routing 
and key distribution. 
2.1. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
IN MANET 
  The difference between wired 
infrastructure networks and mobile ad hoc 
networks raises the need for new IDS models that 
can handle new security challenges. Due to the 
security needs in MANET, a cooperative intrusion 
detection model has been proposed, where every 
node participates in running its IDS in order to 
collect and identify possible intrusions. If an 
anomaly is detected with weak evidence, then a 
global detection process is initiated for further 
investigation about the intrusion through a secure 
channel. An extension of this model was 
proposed, where a set of intrusions can be 
identified with their corresponding sources. 
Moreover, the authors address the problem of 
runtime resource constraints through modeling a 
repeatable and random leader election framework. 
An elected leader is responsible for detecting 
intrusions for a predefined period of time. Unlike 
our work, the random election scheme does not 
consider the remaining resources of nodes or the 
presence of selfish nodes.  
A modular IDS system based on mobile 
agents is proposed and the authors point out the 
impact of limited computational and battery power 
on the network monitoring tasks. Again, the 
solution ignores both the difference in remaining 
resources and the selfishness issue. To motivate 
the selfish nodes in routing, CONFIDANT 
proposes a reputation system where each node 
keeps track of the misbehaving nodes. The 
reputation system is built on the negative 
evaluations rather than positive impression. 
Whenever a specific threshold is exceeded, an 
appropriate action is taken against the node. 
Therefore, nodes are motivated to participate by 
punishing the misbehaving ones through giving a 
negative reputation. As a consequence of such a 
design, a malicious node can broadcast a negative 
impression about a node in order to be punished. 
On the other hand, CORE [2] is proposed as a 
cooperative enforcement mechanism based on 
monitoring and reputation systems. The goal of 
this model is to detect selfish nodes and enforce 
them to cooperate. Each node keeps track of other 
nodes cooperation using reputation as a metric. 
CORE ensures that misbehaving nodes are 
punished by gradually excluding them from 
communication services. In this model, the 
reputation is calculated based on data monitored 
by local nodes and information provided by other 
nodes involved in each operation. In contrast to 
such passive approaches, our solution proactively 
encourages nodes to behave honestly through 
computing reputations based on mechanism 
design. Moreover, it is able to punish misbehaving 
leaders through a cooperative punishment system 
based on cooperative game theory. In addition to 
this, a noncooperative game is designed to help 
the leader IDS to increase the probability of 
detection by distributing the node’s sampling over 
the most critical links.  
2.2. APPLICATION OF MECHANISM 
DESIGN 
  As a subfield of microeconomics and game 
theory, mechanism design has received extensive 
studies in microeconomics for modeling 
economical activities. Nisan and Ronen apply 
mechanism design for solving the least-cost path 
and task scheduling problem. Distributed 
mechanism design based on VCG is first 
introduced in a direct extension of Border 
Gateway Protocol (BGP) for computing the lowest 
cost routes. Moreover, the authors outlined the 
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basics of distributed mechanism design and 
reviewed the results done on multicast cost 
sharing and interdomain routing. Mechanism 
design has been used for routing purposes in 
MANETs, such as a truthful ad-hoc-VCG 
mechanism for finding the most cost-efficient 
route in the presence of selfish nodes. In [9], the 
authors provide an incentive compatible auction 
scheme to enable packet forwarding services in 
MANETs using VCG; a continuous auction 
process is used to determine the distribution of 
bandwidth, and incentives are given as monetary 
rewards. To our best knowledge, this work is 
among the first efforts in applying mechanism 
design theory to address the security issues in 
MANETs, in particular, the leader election for 
intrusion detection. This paper is the extension of 
[4], where we presented the leader election 
mechanism in a static environment without 
addressing different performance overhead. 
2.3. LEADER ELECTION 
APPLICATIONS 
  Distributed algorithms for clustering and 
leader election have been addressed in different 
research work [5]. These algorithms can be 
classified into two categories: Cluster-first or 
leader-first. In the cluster first approach, a cluster 
is formed, and then, the nodes belonging to that 
cluster elect a leader node. In the leader first 
approach, a set of leader nodes is elected first, 
then the other nodes are assigned to different 
leader nodes. Some of the methods assume that 
there exist a weight associated with each node or 
there exist a trusted authority to certify each 
node’s metric (weight) which is used to elect a 
leader. We consider these assumptions as quite 
strong for MANET. Our model is able to run in a 
clustered and nonclustered network where we are 
able to perform better results with respect to 
different performance metrics. 
3. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
  We consider an MANET where each node 
has an IDS and a unique identity. To achieve the 
goal of electing the most cost-efficient nodes as 
leaders in the presence of selfish and malicious 
nodes, the following challenges arise: First, the 
resource level that reflects the cost of analysis is 
considered as private information. As a result, the 
nodes can reveal fake information about their 
resources if that could increase their own benefits. 
Second, the nodes might behave normally during 
the election but then deviate from normal behavior 
by not offering the IDS service to their voted 
nodes. 
  In our model, we consider MANET as an 
undirected graph G = (N,L), where N is the set of 
nodes and L is the set of bidirectional links. We 
denote the cost of analysis vector as C = {c1, 
c2,…cn} where n is the number of nodes in N. We 
denote the election process as a function vtk(C, i), 
where vtk(C, i) = 1 if a node i votes for a node k; 
vtk(C, i) = 0, otherwise. We assume that each 
elected leader allocates the same budget B for 
each node that has voted for it. Knowing that the 
total budget will be distributed among all the 
voting nodes according to their reputation. This 
will motivate the nodes to cooperate in every 
election round that will be held on every time 
TELECT . Thus, the model will be repeatable. For 
example, if B = 25 packet/sec and the leader gets 
three votes, then the leader’s sampling budget is 
75 packet/sec. This value is divided among the 
three nodes based on their reputation value. The 
objective of minimizing the global cost of analysis 
while serving all the nodes can be expressed by 
the following Social Choice Function (SCF): 
SCF = S(C) = min .).,(. 




∑∑
∈∈ Ni
k
Nk
k
BiCvtc  
  Clearly, in order to minimize this SCF, the 
following must be achieved. First, we need to 
design incentives for encouraging each node in 
revealing its true cost of analysis value c. Second, 
we need to design an election algorithm that can 
provably minimize the above SCF while not 
incurring too much of the performance overhead.  
4. LEADER ELECTION MECHANISM 
4.1 MECHANISM DESIGN 
BACKGROUND 
  Mechanism design is a subfield of 
microeconomics and game theory. Mechanism 
design uses game theory tools to achieve the 
desired goals. The main difference between game 
theory and mechanism design is that the former 
can be used to study what could happen when 
independent players act selfishly. On the other 
hand, mechanism design allows a game designer 
to define rules in terms of the SCF such that 
players will play according to these rules. The 
balance of IDS resource consumption problem can 
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be modeled using mechanism design theory with 
an objective function that depends on the private 
information of the players. In our case, the private 
information of the player is the cost of analysis 
which depends on the player’s energy level. Here, 
the rational players select to deliver the untruthful 
or incomplete information about their preferences 
if that leads to individually better outcomes [10]. 
The main goal of using mechanism design [7] is to 
address this problem by:  1) designing incentives 
for players (nodes) to provide truthful information 
about their preferences over different Outcomes 
and 2) computing the optimal system-wide 
solution, which is defined according to (1).  
  A mechanism design model consists of n 
agents where each agent i ∈  {1, ………, n } has a 
private information, 
i
φ i ∈  
i
θ , known as the 
agent’s type. Moreover, it defines a set of 
strategies Ai for each agent i. The agent can 
choose any strategy ai ∈  Ai to input in the 
mechanism. According to the inputs (ai, . . . , an) of 
all the agents, the mechanism calculates an output 
o = o(a1, . . . , an) and payment vector p = (p1, . . . , 
pn), where pi = pi(a1,. . . , an). The preference of 
each agent from the output is calculated by a 
valuation function vi( iθ , o). This is a 
quantification in terms of a real number to 
evaluate the output for an agent i. Thus, the utility 
of a node is calculated as ui = pi - vi( iθ , o). This 
means that the utility is the combination of output 
measured by valuation function and the payment it 
receives from the mechanism.  
  In direct revelation mechanism, every 
agent i has a type 
i
θ . Each agent gives an input 
ai( iθ ) to the mechanism. The agent chooses the 
strategy according to its type, where ai( iθ ) = _i, 
which is chosen from the strategy set  θ = 
{Selfish; Normal}. We assume that normal agents 
follow the protocol, whereas selfish agents deviate 
from the defined protocol if the deviation leads to 
a higher utility. Although the prime objective of 
these agents is not to actively harm others but 
their presence can passively harm others.  
  Last but not least, the mechanism provides 
a global output from the input vector and also 
computes a specific payment for each agent. The 
goal is to design a strategy proof mechanism 
where each agent gives an input based on its real 
type 
i
θ  such that it maximizes its utility regardless 
of the strategies of others. A strategy is dominated 
by another strategy if the second strategy is at 
least as good as the other one regardless of the 
other players’ strategy. This is expressed as 
follows: 
pi - vi(
*
i
θ , o) = *
i
u ≥  ui = pi - vi( iθ , o), 
  where *
i
θ  denotes nonselfishness and 
i
θ  
denotes selfishness. Note that ui is maximized 
only when pi is given by the mechanism. The 
question is: How to design the payments in a way 
that makes truth-telling the dominant strategy? In 
other words, how to motivate nodes to reveal 
truthfully their valuation function vi(
*
i
θ , o)? The 
VCG mechanism answers this question by giving 
the nodes a fixed payment independent of the 
nodes’ valuation, which is equal to the second best 
valuation. The design of the payment, according 
to our scenarios, is given in the following sections. 
A general overview of mechanism design can be 
found in [8]. 
4.2. THE MECHANISM MODEL 
  We treat the IDS resource consumption 
problem as a game where the N mobile nodes are 
the agents/players. Each node plays by revealing 
its own private information which is based on the 
node’s type 
i
θ . The type 
i
θ  is drawn from each 
player’s available type set 
i
θ  = {Normal, Selfish}. 
Each player selects his own strategy/type 
according to how much the node values the 
outcome. If the player’s strategy is normal, then 
the node reveals the true cost of analysis. We 
assume that each player i has a utility function: 
ui( iθ ) = pi - vi( iθ , o( iθ , i−θ  )), - (2) 
where .  
• 
i−θ  is the type of all the other nodes except 
i. 
• vi is the valuation of player i of the output 
o ∈  O, knowing that O is the set of 
possible outcomes. In our case, if the node 
is elected, then vi is the cost of analysis ci. 
Otherwise, vi is 0 since the node will not 
be the leader, and hence, there will be no 
cost to run the IDS. 
• pi ∈  ℜ  is the payment given by the 
mechanism to the elected node. Payment is 
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given in the form of reputation. Nodes that 
are not elected receive no payment. 
  Note that ui( iθ ) is what the player usually 
seeks to maximize. It reflects the amount of 
benefits gained by player i if he follows a specific 
type 
i
θ . Players might deviate from revealing the 
truthful valuation for the cost of analysis if that 
could lead to a better payoff. Therefore, our 
mechanism must be strategy-proof where truth-
telling is the dominant strategy. To play the game, 
every node declares its corresponding cost of 
analysis where the cost vector C is the input of our 
mechanism. For each input vector, the mechanism 
calculates its corresponding output o = o(
i
θ , . . . , 
n
θ ) and a payment vector p = (p1, . . . ,pn). 
Payments are used to motivate players to behave 
in accordance with the mechanism goals. In the 
following sections, we will formulate the 
following components: 
1. Cost of analysis function: It is needed by the 
nodes to compute the valuation function. 
2. Reputation system: It is needed to show 
how: 
  a. Incentives are used once they are 
granted. 
  b. Misbehaving nodes are catched and   
       punished. 
3.Payment design: It is needed to design the 
amount of incentives that will be given to 
the nodes based on VCG. 
4.3 COST OF ANALYSIS FUNCTION 
  During the design of the cost of analysis 
function, the following two problems arise: First, 
the energy level is considered as private and 
sensitive information and should not be disclosed 
publicly. Such a disclosure of information can be 
used maliciously for attacking the node with the 
least resources level. Second, if the cost of 
analysis function is designed only in terms of 
nodes’ energy level, then the nodes with the low 
energy level will not be able to contribute and 
increase their reputation values. 
  To solve the above problems, we design 
the cost of analysis function with the following 
two properties: Fairness and Privacy. The former 
is to allow nodes with initially less resources to 
contribute and serve as leaders in order to increase 
their reputation. On the other hand, the latter is 
needed to avoid the malicious use of the resources 
level, which is considered as the most sensitive 
information. To avoid such attacks and provide 
fairness, the cost of analysis is designed based on 
the reputation value, the expected number of time 
slots that a node wants to stay alive in a cluster, 
and energy level. Note that the expected number 
of slots and energy level are considered as the 
nodes’ private information.  
 
                     Fig. 4.3.1. Reputation system model. 
4.4. REPUTATION SYSTEM MODEL 
  Before we design the payment, we need to 
show how the payment in the form of reputation 
can be used to: 1) motivate nodes to behave 
normally and 2) punish the misbehaving nodes. 
Moreover, it can be used to determine whom to 
trust. To motivate the nodes in behaving normally 
in every election round, we relate the cluster’s 
services to nodes’ reputation. This will create a 
competition environment that motivates the nodes 
to behave normally by saying the truth. To enforce 
our mechanism, a punishment system is needed to 
prevent nodes from behaving selfishly after the 
election. Misbehaving nodes are punished by 
decreasing their reputation, and consequently, are 
excluded from the cluster services if the reputation 
is less than a predefined threshold. As an 
extension to our model, we can extend our 
reputation system to include different sources of 
information such as routing and key distribution 
with different assigned weights.  
4.5. CILE PAYMENT DESIGN 
  In CILE, each node must be monitored by 
a leader node that will analyze the packets for 
other ordinary nodes. Based on the cost of 
analysis vector C, nodes will cooperate to elect a 
set of leader nodes that will be able to analyze the 
traffic across the whole network and handle the 
monitoring process. This increases the efficiency 
and balances the resource consumption of an IDS 
in the network. Our mechanism provides 
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payments to the elected leaders for serving others. 
The payment is based on a per-packet price that 
depends on the number of votes the elected nodes 
get. The nodes that do not get any vote from 
others will not receive any payment. The payment 
is in the form of reputations, which are then used 
to allocate the leader’s sampling budget for each 
node. Hence, any node will strive to increase its 
reputation in order to receive more IDS services 
from its corresponding leader.  
 
Fig 4.5.1.An example of leader election. 
 
4.6. CDLE PAYMENT DESIGN 
  In CDLE, the whole network is divided 
into a set of clusters where a set of 1-hop neighbor 
nodes forms a cluster. Here, we use the scheme to 
cluster the nodes into 1-hop clusters. Each cluster 
then independently elects a leader among all the 
nodes to handle the monitoring process based on 
nodes’ analysis cost. Our objective is to find the 
most cost-efficient set of leaders that handle the 
detection process for the whole network. Hence, 
our social choice function is still as in (1). To 
achieve the desired goal, payments are computed 
using the VCG mechanism where truth-telling is 
proved to be dominant. Like CILE, CDLE 
provides payment to the elected node and the 
payment is based on a per-packet price that 
depends on the number of votes the elected node 
gets.  
5. LEADER ELECTION ALGORITHM 
  To run the election mechanism, we 
propose a leader election algorithm that helps to 
elect the most cost-efficient leaders with less 
performance overhead compared to the network 
flooding model. We devise all the needed 
messages to establish the election mechanism 
taking into consideration cheating and presence of 
malicious nodes. Moreover, we consider the 
addition and removal of nodes to/from the 
network due to mobility reasons. Finally, the 
performance overhead is considered during the 
design of the given algorithm where computation, 
communication, and storage overhead are derived. 
5.1. OBJECTIVES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
  To design the leader election algorithm, 
the following requirements are needed: 1) To 
protect all the nodes in a network, every node 
should be monitored by a leader and 2) to balance 
the resource consumption of IDS service, the 
overall cost of analysis for protecting the whole 
network is minimized. In other words, every node 
has to be affiliated with the most cost-efficient 
leader among its neighbors. Our algorithm is 
executed in each node taking into consideration 
the following assumptions about the nodes and the 
network architecture: 
• Every node knows its (2-hop) neighbors, 
which is reasonable since nodes usually 
maintain a table about their neighbors for 
routing purposes. 
• Loosely synchronized clocks are available 
between nodes. 
• Each node has a key pair for establishing a 
secure communication between nodes. 
• Each node is aware of the presence of a 
new node or removal of a node. 
  For secure communication, we can use a 
combination of TESLA and public key 
infrastructure. With the help of TESLA, loosely 
synchronized clocks can be available. Nodes can 
use public key infrastructure during election and 
TESLA in other cases. Recent investigations 
showed that computationally limited mobile nodes 
can also perform public key operations. 
5.2. LEADER ELECTION 
  To start a new election, the election 
algorithm uses four types of messages. Hello, used 
by every node to initiate the election process; 
Begin-Election, used to announce the cost of a 
node; Vote, sent by every node to elect a leader; 
and Acknowledge, sent by the leader to broadcast 
its payment, and also as a confirmation of its 
leadership. For describing the algorithm, we use 
the following notation: 
• service-table(k): The list of all ordinary 
nodes, those voted for the leader node k. 
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• reputation-table(k): The reputation table of 
node k. Each node keeps the record of 
reputation of all other nodes.  
• neighbors(k): The set of node k’s 
neighbors.  
• leadernode(k): The ID of node k’s leader. 
If node k is running its own IDS, then the 
variable contains k.  
• leader(k): A boolean variable that sets to 
TRUE if node k is a leader and FALSE 
otherwise. 
  Initially, each node k starts the election 
procedure by broadcasting a Hello message to all 
the nodes that are 1 hop from node k and starts a 
timer T1. This message contains the hash value of 
the node’s cost of analysis and its unique identifier 
(ID). This message is needed to avoid cheating 
where further analysis is conducted.  
Algorithm 1 (Executed by every node) 
/* On receiving Hello, all nodes reply with their 
cost */ 
1. if (received Hello from all neighbors) then 
2.  Send Begin-Election (IDk; costk); 
3. else if(neighbors(k) = φ ) then 
4. Launch IDS. 
5. end if 
  On expiration of T1, each node k checks 
whether it has received all the hash values from its 
neighbors. Nodes from whom the Hello message 
have not received are excluded from the election. 
On receiving the Hello from all neighbors, each 
node sends Begin-Election as in Algorithm 1, 
which contains the cost of analysis of the node, 
and then, starts timer T2. If node k is the only node 
in the network or it does not have any neighbors, 
then it launches its own IDS.  
 
 
Algorithm 2 (Executed by every node) 
/* Each node votes for one node among the 
neighbors */ 
1. if (∀  n ε neighbor(k), 9 i ε n : ci ≤  cn) then 
2.  send Vote(IDk, IDi, costj≠ i); 
3. leadernode(k) := i; 
5. end if 
  On expiration of T2, the node k compares 
the hash value of Hello to the value received by 
the Begin-Election to verify the cost of analysis 
for all the nodes. Then, node k calculates the least-
cost value among its neighbors and sends Vote for 
node i as in Algorithm 2. The Vote message 
contains the IDk of the source node, the IDi of the 
proposed leader, and second least cost among the 
neighbors of the source node costj≠ i. Then, node 
k sets node i as its leader in order to update later 
on its reputation. Note that the second least cost of 
analysis is needed by the leader node to calculate 
the payment. If node k has the least cost among all 
its neighbors, then it votes for itself and starts 
timer T3.  
Algorithm 3 (Executed by Elected leader node) 
/* Send Acknowledge message to the neighbor 
nodes */ 
1. Leader(i) := TRUE; 
2. Compute Payment, Pi; 
3. updateservice-table(i); 
4. updatereputation-table(i); 
5. Acknowledge = Pi + all the votes; 
6. Send Acknowledge (i); 
7. Launch IDS. 
  On expiration of T3, the elected node i 
calculates its payment using (5) and sends an 
Acknowledge message to all the serving nodes as 
in Algorithm 3. The Acknowledge message 
contains the payment and all the votes the leader 
received. The leader then launches its IDS.  
  Each ordinary node verifies the payment 
and updates its reputation table according to the 
payment. All the messages are signed by the 
respective source nodes to avoid any kind of 
cheating. At the end of the election, nodes are 
divided into two types: Leader and ordinary 
nodes. Leader nodes run the IDS for inspecting 
packets, during an interval TELECT, based on the 
relative reputations of the ordinary nodes. We 
enforce reelection every period TELECT since it is 
unfair and unsafe for one node to be a leader 
forever.  Even if the topology remains same after 
TELECT time, all the nodes go back to initial stage 
and elect a new leader according to the above 
algorithms. 
6. ENERGY EFFICIENT LEADER 
ELECTION MODEL 
  The system is designed to handle leader 
election and intrusion detection process. The 
clustering scheme is optimized with coverage and 
traffic level. Cost and resource utilization is 
controlled under the clusters. Node mobility is 
managed by the system. The system is designed to 
perform intrusion detection on MANET 
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environment with energy management. Intrusion 
detection operations are initiated by the leader 
nodes. The anomaly based model is used for the 
intrusion detection process. The system is divided 
into five major modules. They are Network 
analysis, Clustering process, Leader Election, 
Detector assignment and Intrusion Detection. 
The network analysis module is designed 
to find out the neighbor details. Clustering process 
module is designed to group up the nodes. Cluster 
leader node is selected with resource levels. 
Detector assignment module is designed to place 
intrusion detector application. The intrusion 
detection process is performed with network 
transactions. 
 
6.1. NETWORK ANALYSIS 
  The network node status information are 
collected in this module. Neighbor nodes and their 
resource levels are collected and updated. 
Computational and storage details are also 
collected from the nodes. Network status details 
are periodically updated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig.6.2.1.Intrusion Detection System for MANET 
 
6.2. CLUSTERING PROCESS 
  The neighborhood nodes are grouped into 
clusters. The clusters are formed with coverage 
and traffic information. The cluster details are 
updated in intervals. The cluster resources are 
shared by the nodes.  
 
6.3. LEADER ELECTION  
  The leader is elected for each cluster. The 
resource and energy details are considered in the 
leader selection process. The leader nodes are 
assigned with incentives. Reputation is provided 
with reference to incentives. 
 
Fig. 6.2.2. An MANET after adding a new node. 
6.4. DETECTOR ASSIGNMENT 
  The detector responds for the intrusion 
detection process. The detector is placed with 
reference to the resource levels. The leader node is 
assigned with detector module. The detector 
collects all transactions for intrusion detection 
process. 
6.5. INTRUSION DETECTION 
The intrusion detection process is initiated 
in intervals. Dynamic interval estimation is used 
in the system. The Bayesian classification 
technique is used for intrusion detection process. 
The intrusion detection results are passed to the 
requested node. 
7. CONCLUSION 
  The mobile ad-hoc networks are 
infrastructure less environment. Leader nodes are 
used to initiate the intrusion detection process. 
Resource sharing and lifetime management factors 
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are considered in the leader election process. The 
system optimizes the leader election and intrusion 
detection process. The system reduces the energy 
consumption. Network traffic is reduced by the 
system. Dynamic interval is assigned for intrusion 
detection process.  
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